



The Effects of Populism on Muslim Minorities: How Politicians' Distrust in Islam Affects Muslim Attitudes towards Violence in the Netherlands?

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Abstract

Extreme right pronouncements concerning Muslim minorities in the Netherlands have been on the political agenda since the eighties of the last century. However, the intensity of extreme right pronouncements has increasingly been more negative creating a sphere of political distrust in politics, politicians and democracy. Specific verbal remarks made by Dutch politicians, time and again suggest a link between Muslims, Islam and violence. The central question in this article is whether Muslim inclination toward violence or hard approach 'physical if necessary' can be predicted by centrality of Islam together with the variable Dutch politicians' negative remarks about Islam and Muslims. In this article a model is hypothesized and constructed by way of logistic regression to predict the probability of inclination toward violence. The findings show that variables such as gender, discrimination, theological belief that Islam forbids politics and the variable state intervention in religious affairs such as appointing a mufti (versus communal election) are good predictors of Muslim individuals' inclination toward violence.

Keywords: Populism, Muslim Minorities, Islam, Confidence in politics, Violence.

Abstrak

Pernyataan ekstrem kanan tentang minoritas Muslim di Belanda telah menjadi agenda politik sejak tahun delapan puluhan abad lalu. Namun, intensitas pernyataan ekstrem kanan semakin negatif menciptakan ruang ketidakpercayaan politik pada politik, politisi, dan demokrasi. Pernyataan lisan khusus yang dibuat oleh politisi Belanda, berkali-kali menunjukkan hubungan antara Muslim, Islam, dan kekerasan. Pertanyaan sentral dalam artikel ini adalah apakah kecenderungan Muslim terhadap kekerasan atau pendekatan keras 'fisik jika perlu' dapat diprediksi oleh sentralitas Islam bersama dengan berbagai pernyataan negatif politisi Belanda tentang Islam dan Muslim. Dalam artikel ini sebuah model dihipotesiskan dan dibangun dengan cara regresi logistik untuk memprediksi kemungkinan kecenderungan kekerasan. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa variabel seperti gender, diskriminasi, keyakinan teologis bahwa Islam melarang politik dan variabel intervensi negara dalam urusan agama seperti penunjukan mufti (versus pemilihan komunal) merupakan prediktor yang baik dari kecenderungan individu Muslim terhadap kekerasan.

Kata Kunci: Populisme, Minoritas Muslim, Islam, Keyakinan dalam politik, Kekerasan.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations report in 2019 on hate speech emphasizes the term ‘incitement’ to be a dangerous form of communication. Incitement is considered to be explicitly salient as well as deliberate in the way a hostile message is communicated with the objective to inflict discrimination and even violence, which may or may not include terrorist activities or basically commit crimes.¹ The report and its description of hate speech in this report are not meant to be formulated in a light way. Unfortunately, this UN-report has an achilles heel; hate speech lacks a unanimous definition and it is not prohibited by international law. The conclusion of the report is that hate speech must be labelled to be a harmful disposition on social life. The Netherlands is considered to be an established democracy with a count of almost one million Muslims within the industrialized urban areas called the Randstad². Without a doubt the first politician who became salient on the immigration issue was Hans Janmaat who was the leader of a political party called the *Centrum Democraten* during the eighties of the last century. Janmaat was considered to be an outcast within the political establishment due to the fact that his ideas were centred around immigration problems in the Netherlands. For the first time there was a Dutch politician awkwardly salient and his boldest pronouncement was probably ‘full is full’, meaning that the Netherlands needed to close down the gates for foreigners. Foreigners were especially ethnic Turkish and Moroccan guest labourers who came to the Netherlands on invitation of the Dutch state. The emphasis being on ethnicity and economic cheap workers rather than religion or Muslim minorities.

Janmaat’s remarks were not as intense as contemporary politicians’ remarks of our day. However, Janmaat was rather exclusive in a justly proud and tolerant country that welcomed those who were peace-loving, hardworking and secular-liberal. Yet, Janmaat knew to create a contrast and make a connection between disappointing economic growth, unemployment and government cutbacks to the presence of immigrants. Janmaat was constructing the basis of the narrative that a multicultural society with policies of integration were not realistic alternatives. Instead, he argued for assimilation policies with a last resort to send those who failed assimilation to return to their home countries. Meindert Fennema remarked that Janmaat was ousted by the establishment for petty pronouncements which back then were considered as hate speech and racism. Today, new extreme-right parties and their respective leaders such as Geert Wilders (PVV)³ and Thierry Baudet (FvD) have booked even greater electoral wins with much severe pronouncements about immigrants in comparison to Janmaat. Today the public as well as political debates concentrate not on ethnic minorities but on religious minorities, the Muslims. Especially Wilders triumphed to prompt much anger and frustration within the Dutch Muslim communities. There are numerous studies that reveal second and third generation Muslim hurt and exclusion in a society of people they were born in.

The two most extreme pronouncements of the PVV leader Geert Wilders were in 2004 and 2016 when Wilders received severe criticism from Muslim communities and he had to appear before court because of his remarks. Wilders is known to have made many remarks over

¹ António Guterres, ‘United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech’, *Taken from: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/U_no.20Strategy* (2019).

² Randstad is the industrialized area between Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague.

³ The Dutch Party for Freedom

the years about Islam and Muslims. Yet, Wilders was acquitted for the first prosecution in 2004 but he was convicted for the remarks he made in 2016.⁴ For Wilders his conviction was proof of a Dutch society that had become sickening.⁵ Wilders is known for his strong voiced views and remarks that counter much condemnation within the Dutch society as well as amongst Muslim minorities. For example, one of his remarks concerns the *islamization* of the nation where Islam is associated with totalitarianism, a type of theological ideology that features extremism and advocates violence to its followers aspiring to tear down Western civilisation. In this narrative Islam as a religion intends to overpower not only the Dutch society but the whole Western world. Other extreme pronouncement of Wilders concerns the association of the Quran with Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and his political narrative of targeting Moroccan community as an ethnic group as being violent and felonious.⁶ Furthermore, Wilders has also proposed to close down mosques, ban the Quran, ban Muslims to enter the Netherlands and revoke passports of Muslims born in the Netherlands. Wilders' pronouncements often involve mainly Islam as an intolerant religion including in his narrative especially one ethnic group, the Moroccan minorities, uttering the Moroccan community to be delinquent inspired by the Islamic faith.⁷ According to ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) Wilders' pronouncements are problematic as they erode the fundamental values of democracy and disrupt constitutional rights of others based on Islamophobia and alleged incompatibly with democratic values.⁸

Some other examples of negative remarks made by politicians are by Mark Rutte⁹ who on a TV show in 2016 let his emotions take over and say 'My primary first feeling is: Go back to Turkey yourself. They can F*** Off', I would say' referring to Turkish young people who on asking about the coup attempt in 2016 stated to be loyal to the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and had chased away a camera team of the national news agency NOS. One journalist on a later occasion 'dared to doubt the prime minister in using such harsh words against the Dutch people too'.¹⁰ According to the prime minister, these Turkish young people could leave

⁴ Erica Howard, *Freedom of Expression and Religious Hate Speech in Europe* (Routledge, 2017), 139.

⁵ *Video: Nederland Is Een Ziek Land Geworden (Video: The Netherlands Has Become a Sick Country)*, n.d.

⁶ Howard, *Freedom of Expression and Religious Hate Speech in Europe*, 140.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ 'Tweede Kamer, 24e Vergadering Donderdag 12 November 2020 "Dutch Parliament Minutes"' (Dutch Parliament), accessed 24 May 2022, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2020-2021/24#id98dfa8a8.

Other remarks of Wilders in Dutch Parliament Minutes This also became painfully clear immediately after the gruesome beheading of Samuel Paty. More than 120,000 Dutch Muslims signed a petition from an imam calling for insulting the prophet Mohammed to be criminalized. So 120,000 Dutch Muslims did not sign against terror, but against freedom of expression, against our values! It's too sick for words, but it can't really surprise anyone. Because from a study by Professor Koopmans we knew since 2015 that no less than 70% of Muslims in the Netherlands consider their own Islamic rules more important than the democratically established rules in the Netherlands. So, it's not a few bad apples that ruin it for the rest of the Muslims. Stop preaching that nonsense fairy tale, I tell the Prime Minister. This is a large majority of 700,000 Muslims who reject our free society. And you, Prime Minister, with Islam you have imported a monster to our country that has put our country in great danger'.

⁹ Gloria Wekker, 'Door Gloria Wekker En Mariël Kanne', *Eenzaamheid En Verbinding in Het Sociale Domein*, 2018, 119. 'Ga zelf terug naar Turkije. Pleur op, zou ik in plat Haags zeggen. Ze kunnen oprotten'.

¹⁰ Algemeen Dagblad, 'Rutte Onder Vuur Om "Pleur Op"', 22 September 2016, <https://www.ad.nl/nieuws/rutte-onder-vuur-om-pleur-op~aa502147/>.

the country if they continued like this.¹¹ Another remark was made by Ahmed Aboutaleb who is known to say 'If you don't like it here... because some humourists you don't like are producing a newspaper ... you can sod off'¹² after the attack on Charlie Hebdo.¹³ This was a volatile moment in Europe right after a deadly attack when twelve people were killed and eleven were injured in Paris. It was after this attack that the Mayor of Rotterdam directed his words to a Dutch Muslim community, who felt the attention imposed to account for these attacks.

According to De Koning the recent decades the Netherlands has developed a governmentality problem. Governmentality for De Koning is a form of a state mechanism that monitors and attempts to discipline Muslims into being liberal subjects. According to De Koning this state interference to domesticate the Muslims is facing counter resistance.¹⁴ One example of such a resistance according to De Koning is the radicalized young Muslims also known to be Salafis, who became well-known by the name The Hofstad Group. The interaction between the Hofstad Network and the Dutch governmental policies is such an example of a theologized resistance. For De Koning the Dutch state has pursued policies that he refers to as 'conduct the conduct' meant for particular individuals shaping, informing, guiding by particular governmental practices. According to De Koning these governmental techniques are predominantly used as instruments through media channels as well as in national deliberations concerning Islam and the issue of integration of Muslims and counter-radicalisation policies.¹⁵ De Koning states that in post-nine-eleven period the focus on integration of minorities have dramatically shifted to more intense type of policies with focus on Islam and Muslims. With this new policy focus came the securitization of policies¹⁶ and Muslims being categorically linked to violence and threat.¹⁷ In Mamdani's words the categorization was a basic dichotomization of Islam as 'good Islam' versus 'bad Islam' of which the latter associated with violence.¹⁸

According to De Koning the post-nine-eleven period is when the Islam debate grew more and more confrontational and harsher, political denouncing of Islam as a violent and intolerant religion which could not be compatible with the Dutch moral community.¹⁹ The counter-conduct of the Hofstad Network may have been an integral part, and a product, of the integration and counter-radicalisation policies; the network, in turn, was responsible for the sense of urgency among policy-makers and for actually strengthening the image of Islam as a threat to security.²⁰

¹¹ MNC Aarts, 'Verveling of Nuttig Niets Doen', *C-Vakblad van Logeion* 28, no. 8 (2016): 7–7.

¹² The Economist, 'When Nuance Is Hard to Hear', 15 January 2015, <https://www.economist.com/briefing/2015/01/15/when-nuance-is-hard-to-hear>.

¹³ Maarten Neuteboom, 'Moslim Zijn Betekent Voor Mij Een Mens van Het Midden Zijn', *Christen Democratische Verkenningen* 2015, no. 2 (2020).

¹⁴ Martijn De Koning, '„We Reject You “—«Counter-Conduct» and Radicalisation of the Dutch Hofstad Network', *Radikaler Islam Im Jugendalter*, 2013, 93.

¹⁵ Ibid., 95.

¹⁶ Rens Vliegenthart, 'Framing Immigration and Integration: Facts, Parliament, Media and Anti-Immigrant Party Support in the Netherlands', 2007.

¹⁷ Ertuğrul Gökçekuyu, 'Political Appraisals Constituting Tolerant versus Radical Identities: An Empirical Comparison between Dutch and British Muslims', *Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi* 3, no. 1 (2021): 68–81.

¹⁸ Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (Harmony, 2005).

¹⁹ Frank J Buijs, 'Muslims in the Netherlands: Social and Political Developments after 9/11', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35, no. 3 (2009): 421–38.

²⁰ De Koning, '„We Reject You “—«Counter-Conduct» and Radicalisation of the Dutch Hofstad Network', 104.

Discrimination and Governmental Intervention

Buijs confirms the image depicted by De Koning and argues that the Dutch integration policies had created much ambiguity and reactionary attitudes among Dutch Muslims. Salafism had raised the political as well as regulatory alarm of a national security threat. From a societal perspective two fronts were formed, on one side the democratic government and on the other a radicalized front, of which both fronts struggled to win over young Muslims.²¹ In this struggle young Muslims experienced social exclusion and discrimination in daily life such as salient police monitoring, new challenges in finding traineeship places and increasing rejections in the labour market bringing much insecurity and new issues of inequality. Buijs' study shows Muslims substantiating the societal confrontations and negative consequences such as discrimination and xenophobia by native Dutch.²² Other studies corroborate these findings that one fifth of Dutch people were prejudiced against Muslims in the Netherlands.²³ These individual experiences are known to have affected young Muslim individuals as second-class people.

Other research denote profound psychological consequences of Muslim individuals being portrayed as the 'negative other'²⁴, who are incompatible with Western values.²⁵ Together with media attention deviant behaviour and psychological deterioration have been studied.²⁶ This psychological perspective is considered to be alarming as such harmful consequences may be source for aggression accredited to Muslim individuals as caused by theological factors, while the real problem actually has societal origins. Archer's²⁷ study demonstrates this point that social class categorizations may be manifested in deviant behaviours. Another study on ethnic allochthonous Dutch students discovered that non-native students faced failure in getting appropriate internship placements which according to these students were believed to be caused by ethnoreligious discrimination.²⁸ Such factors as religion and or ethnicity often lie as a source of cause for discrimination.

According to Buijs state policies during the seventies towards Muslims were mainly integration policies, which considerably changed in the decades after.²⁹ However, during the nineties incorporation policies of the government started to change and were redirected to, what was labelled as educational discrepancies or disparities as well inabilities to attain employment with the emphasis on the need for more assimilation and on the encouragement of 'good citizenship' as key government policies.³⁰

²¹ Buijs, 'Muslims in the Netherlands: Social and Political Developments after 9/11', 428.

²² FJ Buijs and JC Rath, 'Muslims in Europe. The State of Research. IMISCOE Working Paper.', 2006.

²³ Karina Velasco González et al., 'Prejudice towards Muslims in the Netherlands: Testing Integrated Threat Theory', *British Journal of Social Psychology* 47, no. 4 (2008): 667–85.

²⁴ Michael Savelkoul et al., 'Comparing Levels of Anti-Muslim Attitudes across Western Countries', *Quality & Quantity* 46, no. 5 (1 August 2012): 1617–24, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-011-9470-9>.

²⁵ Diana D Van Bergen et al., 'Collective Identity Factors and the Attitude toward Violence in Defense of Ethnicity or Religion among Muslim Youth of Turkish and Moroccan Descent', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 47 (2015): 89–100.

²⁶ Carmen H Paalman et al., 'Instruments Measuring Externalizing Mental Health Problems in Immigrant Ethnic Minority Youths: A Systematic Review of Measurement Properties', *PLoS One* 8, no. 5 (2013): e63109.

²⁷ Louise Archer and Hiromi Yamashita, "'Knowing Their Limits"? Identities, Inequalities and Inner City School Leavers' Post-16 Aspirations', *Journal of Education Policy* 18, no. 1 (2003): 53–69.

²⁸ Anthony Haans, 'Who Is We? Identity and Discrimination in the Netherlands.', n.d.

²⁹ Buijs, 'Muslims in the Netherlands: Social and Political Developments after 9/11', 426.

³⁰ Ibid., 427.

One other example of governmental intervention is the establishment of the Umbrella organisation CMO (Contact Orgaan Moslims) in 2004. This organisation is the only known acknowledged non-political organisation that is consulted by the Dutch government in policy matters related to the Muslim communities.³¹ The biggest concern with this organisation is that it is almost completely unknown to the Muslim communities. Considering the utmost important task of representing Muslims interests at the government level it would be expected representation to be transparent, public as well as democratically elected by the people who are represented. This organisation was first established in 2004 upon request of the Minister of Minorities Mrs. R. Verdonk. The ministry had initially facilitated a headquarters and salaries for the representatives, which now is no more the case but the organisation still is considered to be the only consultative organ for Muslim communities.

Another recent news erupting recently is that the Dutch Intelligence Services have been infiltrating Muslim organisations such as mosques and institutions by paid individuals who were tasked with gathering information from within.³² According to the NRC newspaper a private agency 'Nuance door Training & Advies (NTA)' was hired to infiltrate and monitor numerous mosques in the Netherlands. At least ten municipalities had cooperated with the intelligence services to visit mosques and gather private information without revealing their identities in secrecy, which is against the law Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (AP). There were parliamentary questions to the minister of Justice and Security.³³

Lack of Research from Minority Perspective

An important development is the loss of confidence of autochthonous people in Dutch political institutions. This was especially strongest in 2002 which was an effect of the rise of a populist politician Pim Fortuyn, who was assassinated by an extreme left group member in 2002. Fortuyn was especially critical of the establishment parties and the traditional patronising attitude of established Dutch politics. Fortuyn was a charismatic figure who just like Janmaat called out the end of the multicultural Dutch society together with the inevitable 'Islamisation' of the Dutch society.³⁴ Fortuyn, unlike Janmaat was extremely popular and gained much electoral popularity. However, research shows that the effects of destabilising electoral contests are very much correlated with low political trust and communal fears resulting in exclusion driving instability and violence.

Political trust is considered to be a crucial factor for the good functioning and democratic sustainability. Studies demonstrate that decreasing trust in democratically elected political institutions contribute to the spread of 'anti-system' parties such as those of Wilders, but also function as a reaction creating more deviant behaviour as is the case with the Hofstad

³¹ Wasif Shadid, 'Beleidsmatige En Wetenschappelijke Aandacht Voor de Islam in Nederland: Ontwikkeling En Maatschappelijke Gevolgen', *Beleidswetenschap: Kwartaaltijdschrift Voor Beleidsonderzoek En Beleidspraktijk*, 19 (1), 2005.

³² 'Undercover Naar de Moskee: Geheim Onderzoek Naar Islamitische Organisaties', 15 October 2021, <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/10/15/undercover-naar-de-moskee-hoe-gemeenten-al-jaren-een-bedrijf-inhuren-om-heimelijk-islamitische-organisaties-te-onderzoeken-a4061964>.

³³ 'Parliamentary Questions on Dutch Intelligence Services Hiring NTA', n.d., file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Het_bericht_%E2%80%98Undercover_naar_de_moskee_geheim_onderzoek_naar_islamitische_organisaties%E2%80%99.pdf.

³⁴ Buijs, 'Muslims in the Netherlands: Social and Political Developments after 9/11', 423.

Network. The point is that there isn't much research on how religious minorities, such as Muslim minorities in the Netherlands being high on the political agenda perceive trust in politicians as well as political institutions. This study aims to fill the void by looking from the perspective of the Dutch Muslim and how the individual categorizes the self in terms of political trust and inclination toward violence. This article studies political trust from a minority perspective by employing a model to identify political trust in political actors – such as politicians from the perspective of Muslim minorities.³⁵

Research shows that political trust is essential for democratic societies to counter-balance populism, and is therefore invaluable for democratic regimes inhabited by extreme-right parties. If political trust is effective against populism, it also be relevant to tackle deviant behaviour and radicalization. Yet the study of political trust is considered to be a challenge as existing research on political trust remains weak. The Westminster Foundation for Democracy argue for more innovative research to understand political trust better. In this article political trust is distrust also 'negative trust' of specifically Dutch politicians in Muslim individuals. The questionnaire for this study did not refer to trust from or by political institutions but specifically asked whether respondents agree individual politicians making up political institutions trust Muslims or Islam. In order to avoid clarity problems, it is essential to distinguish between political institutions and individuals, the statement in the questionnaire was 'Dutch Politicians trust Islam or Muslims', making clear that we are interested in the opinion of Muslim individuals and whether they categorize Dutch politicians as trusting or distrusting the Muslim and its faith.

According to Van Oudenhoven there are two categories of people, those who identify with the Dutch society and those who do not. Those in the former category are likely to remark ethnic minorities as a threat.³⁶ Populist Dutch politicians, put much emphasis on Islam and Muslims sounding the alarm that the Islamic faith is a threat to national heritage such as culture and identity.³⁷ Previous studies lack in demonstrating what the association of ethnic diversity is on political trust. One example according to Van Oudenhoven is the World Values Survey, that has too few questions on political trust, which fail to make a detailed observation of various forms of political trust. It is all the more reason why this study is significant for filling the void by studying the effects of populist narratives on Muslim minorities such as in the Netherlands.

The Method of Study

In this section I recapitulate on methodology of the study. The study is conducted in the Netherlands by way of multistage sampling as a questionnaire in the year 2019. Data collection complies to the Dutch Authority for the Protection of Personal Information and with the standard ethical norms upheld in the Netherlands. In order to increase the efficiency of targeting Muslim minorities a link of the questionnaire was sent by way of email to ethnic Muslim organizations such as active student unions, Islamic foundations, mosque networks, political parties that are involved in Muslim minority, volunteer and charity activities. A

³⁵ Susan Dodsworth and Nic Cheeseman, 'Political Trust: The Glue That Keeps Democracies Together', London: Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2020.

³⁶ Jan Pieter Van Oudenhoven, Karin S Prins, and Bram P Buunk, 'Attitudes of Minority and Majority Members towards Adaptation of Immigrants', *European Journal of Social Psychology* 28, no. 6 (1998): 995–1013.

³⁷ Maykel Verkuyten and Katarzyna Zaremba, 'Interethnic Relations in a Changing Political Context', *Social Psychology Quarterly* 68, no. 4 (2005): 375–86.

multitude of digital links of the questionnaire were also shared on social networks and media channels using snowball technique referring to as much Muslim public sites as possible to attract genuine interest of Muslim communities that are not only ethnically diverse but also various in terms of socio-economic context. After filtering out cases with missing values there were 796 cases remained rendering 436 males and 360 female participants. The Mage = 31.97 years; SD = 10.657 with an n = 796. The sample consists of 273 Turkish Muslims, 178 Moroccan Muslims, 165 Dutch Muslims and 180 other ethnicities.

Results

Descriptive findings

Statements that were relevant for this study were 'Islam is centrally important in my daily life' with a five-point Likert scale 'Extremely important', 'Important', 'Neutral', 'Not important' and 'Extremely Not Important'. For 73.6% of the respondents Islam was Extremely Important, 24.4% Important, 1.4% were Neutral and 0.3% Not Important and 0.4 Extremely not important. With this statement the study ensured that 98% of the respondents adhere to the centrality of Islam in their daily lives.³⁸

Next variable was the measurement of individual inclination toward 'hard approach: physical if necessary'. In this case a general question was formulated as follows 'Which of the solutions would be best to reduce tensions between Muslims and Non-Muslims'³⁹, 'Hard Approach: physical if necessary', with a five-point Likert scale 'Strongly Agree', 'Agree', 'Neutral', 'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree'. 3.9% of the respondents 'Strongly Agree', 10.1% 'Agree', 23.2% 'Neutral', 26.8% 'Disagree' and 36.1% 'Strongly Disagree'.

Next variable measured the Muslim individual attitude in relation to a so-called governmental intervention of a 'State appointed Mufti', with a five-point Likert scale. 2.8% of the respondents 'Strongly Agree', 9.9% 'Agree', 34.7% 'Neutral', 26% 'Disagree' and 26.6% 'Strongly Disagree'.

Besides these questions, there were questions asked such as 'Have a Sharia Council', 'Have own Muslim Political Party Elected by Muslims', 'Have an Umbrella Organization elected by Muslims', 'Have an Umbrella Organization appointed by the state', 'Have an own elected Mufti', the option to choose explicitly for a 'Soft Approach: interaction and dialogue', 'The importance to follow policies and political developments concerning Muslims in the Netherlands', 'Worrying about the wellbeing of self and family'. 'Special laws to protect Muslims' etc, but none of these variables were good predictors of the dependent variable 'Hard Approach: physical if necessary'.

³⁸ Marilynn B. Brewer and Kathleen P. Pierce, 'Social Identity Complexity and Outgroup Tolerance', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 31, no. 3 (2005): 428–37, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204271710>.

³⁹ Ertuğrul Gökçekuyu, 'Compatibility of Muslim Identity in Political Institutions: From Conflict to Peace', 2019.

TABLE 1: Correlation Analysis

			1	2	3	4		
5	M	D						
1	Hard Approach				1.86	.347		
2	Gender	.162**			1.45	.498		
3	Discriminated	.085*	-.021		1.56	.496		
4	Dutch Politicians Distrust	.076*	.019	-.245**	1.73	.443		
5	Islam Forbids Politics	.116**	.013	.036	.011	1.93	.256	
6	Mufti Appointed by the State	.337**	.073*	.007	.025	.028	1.87	.333
7	Centrality of Islam	.032	.014	.018	-.095**	.039	1.02	.140

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Only the following variables ‘Gender’, ‘Discrimination’, ‘Dutch politicians trust Muslims and Islam’, ‘Islam forbids political Activities’ and ‘Appointed Mufti by the state’ were good predictors for the dependent variable ‘Hard Approach: physical if necessary’. As can be seen on Table 1 the dependent variable is strongly correlated with all variables. The strongest correlation is ($r = .337$, $p < .001$) with the variable Appointed Mufti. All variables are dichotomized and are dummy variables in order to use Logistic Regression. The dependent variable is categorical which yielded predicted estimated probabilities. Other variables in the questionnaire such as ‘Islam is centrally important in my daily life’, ‘Applying Islamic knowledge in my daily life is important’⁴⁰, ‘Voting is an important part of my identity’, ‘Islam plays an important role in my daily decisions’ do not correlate with the variable Hard Approach. They are neither predicted by Logistic Regression nor are good predictors for the variable Hard Approach.

There is a reasonably strong (negative when reverse coded) association between distrust of Dutch politicians and hard approach ($r = .076$, $p < .001$). This means the more a Muslim respondent perceives distrusted by politicians the more such a person perceives Hard Approach to be a solution. As there are no extreme strong correlations in this model multicollinearity was not expected. In order to control for multicollinearity between the variables, a regression analysis was conducted in SPSS version 24⁴¹ for a variance inflation factor (VIF). Myers⁴² states that a VIF-value larger or equal to a numeric value of ten will indicate a statistical multicollinearity, which would cause trouble for the model in this study. Fortunately, the VIF statistic for the above constructed model and variables as shown in Table 1 was 1.065.

⁴⁰ Ibid.


⁴¹ Licensed product by Anadolu University

⁴² Raymond H Myers and Raymond H Myers, *Classical and Modern Regression with Applications*, vol. 2 (Duxbury press Belmont, CA, 1990).

Therefore, the variables do not present any statistical problem for multicollinearity among the variables.

Since this model is a hypothesis test and does not include latent variables a confirmatory factor analysis was not necessary. However, a CFA was conducted for this model with only observed constructs to observe how the model would fit. Given the large sample in the dataset both varimax, promax and oblique rotations delivered very close and similar results. When the model is tested for a Goodness fit by way of AMOS version 24⁴³ the model delivered a X^2 of 56.790 ($p < .001$), where all indices for model fit measure demonstrated that the model has a good model fit with a $X^2 = df = 5.679$, CFI = 0.737, GFI = .9776, AGFI = .953, NFI = .706 and RMSEA = .077 and 90% CI = .060–.086.

TABLE 2



Discussion

The conducted Confirmatory Factor Analysis delivers a determinant of .348 which is a good indication for non-multicollinearity among variables discrimination, Islam forbids politics, state appointed mufti and politicians' trust in Islam or Muslims. A further Pearson correlation analysis shows that these variables are reasonably well correlated as shown in Table 1. It is worth noting that the variable Centrality of Islam in daily life has a high negative correlation $-.095^{**}$ ($p < .001$) with the variable politicians' trust Muslims or Islam. However, there is no significant correlation between Centrality of Islam and the variable Hard Approach. Logistic Regression analysis confirms that the variable Centrality is not a significant predictor of the variable being inclined towards physical or violent behaviour.

Table 3 provides the findings of the Logistic Regression conducted where the variable Hard Approach is the dependent categorical variable together with the predictor variables which are computed from a five-point Likert scale to dichotomous dummy variables with two categories. The latter predictor variables were entered into SPSS version 24 as independent variables to control the effectiveness of the predictor variables and the soundness of the model fit. The outcome variable Hard Approach: physical if necessary is coded 0 = yes, 1 = no. All other predictor variables are coded 0 = yes, 1 = no. Table 3 shows that all independent variables are significant predictors. These variables were the only predictor variables in a 50-item questionnaire in the research.

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TABLE 3: Logistic Regression

Variables in the Equation								95% C.I. for EXP(B)	
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
Step 1 ^a	Discriminated (1)	.676	.234	8.316	1	.004	1.966	1.242	3.114
	Islam Forbids Politics (1)	0.986	.355	7.733	1	.005	2.682	1.338	5.375
	Gender (1)	-.961	.246	15.316	1	.000	.383	.236	.619
	Mufti Appointed by the State (1)	2.024	.252	64.665	1	.000	7.570	4.622	12.398
	Western Politicians Trust (1)	.604	.251	5.777	1	.016	1.830	1.118	.2994
	Constant	-	.384	15.945	1	.000	.216		
		1.534							

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Discriminated, Islam Forbids Politics, Gender, Mufti Appointed by the State, Western Politicians Trust. N = 798

According to Nagelkerke R the variables gender, being discriminated, distrust of the politicians and belief that Islam forbids political activities account for almost 23% of individuals' preference for hard approach. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test indicate that the model is not significant $p = .924$ with $X^2 = 2.547$ which is something we would like to see in a Hosmer and Lemeshow test.

Table 3 shows that the *odds ratio* of the predictor variables are all significant ($p < .05$). The odds of not being prone towards Hard Approach is 1.966 times greater when the individual is not being discriminated. The odds of not being prone towards Hard Approach is 2.682 times greater when the individual believes that Islam does not forbid political activities. However, odds of being prone towards Hard Approach is 0.383 times greater when the individual is a male compared to a female. The odds of not being prone towards Hard Approach is 7.570 times greater when the respondent is believes that a Mufti should be appointed by the Dutch state. Lastly, the odds of not being prone towards Hard Approach is 1.830 times greater when the individual does not believe that Dutch politicians distrust Muslims or Islam.

TABLE 4: Predicted Probabilities

Predicted probability For Hard Approach	Hard Approach 0 = Yes 1 = No	Gender $\beta = -.961$	- Discriminated $\beta = .676$	Islam Forbids Politics $\beta = .986$	Western Politicians Distrust Islam/Muslims $\beta = .604$
0.20881	Yes	Male	Yes	Yes	No
0.42092	Yes	Male	Yes	No	Yes

In Table 4 we see the predicted probabilities of the independent variables predicting the dependent variable. According to this table there is a 20% probability that a male respondent will be violence prone in case the respondent feels to be discriminated, believes that Islam prohibits political activities, and perceives Dutch politicians trust Muslims or Islam. The probability of being prone towards violence increases to 42% for a male respondent who feels to be discriminated, does not believe that Islam forbids political activity, and believes that Dutch politicians distrust Islam or Muslims. The increase is more than doubled even when the variable 'Islam prohibits political activity' is not a factor, where the trust of politicians seems to have great impact on perception of violence.

In line with these findings the constructed model assists our understanding of the effects of populism and negative remarks of politicians on Dutch Muslim minorities. This study is important to understand that hate speech as stated by the UN-report is indeed quite harmful and explains deviant reactions towards violent attitudes within Muslim groups in the Netherlands. It is discussed that the public sphere has become quite harsh where especially young Muslims feel excluded from equal chances for education and employment. There are other studies that indicate that the problem is much greater as institutional racism is a topic that is constantly studied.

We have also discussed that there are other studies that bring the Islamic faith in relation to violence where most studies fail to examine the negative effects on Muslim communities and deviant behaviour. Especially the topic of political distrust is a field that does not attract much academic interest in the Netherlands so far. This is especially more relevant considering that the Netherlands is being overshadowed by increasingly more salient populist pronouncements by extreme right political party movements and their radical leaders.⁴⁴ There are numerous studies that study and express negative views of Dutch natives toward minority groups.⁴⁵

Lastly, the constructed model measured in this study confirms there is a relationship between attitudes towards real hard and physical approach of Muslim individuals and distrust perceived by Dutch political figures. Where individual perceptions of theological attitudes do play a significant role on such deviant behaviour, these attitudes can better be understood when dispersed over social factors being strengthened by negative pronouncements of politicians. It is almost impossible to categorize Muslim differences under one Muslim theological perspective or group. This study only focused on the centrality of Islam in relation to Dutch Muslims that there is meaningful support for the theory that political pronouncements may strengthen inclination toward violence.

⁴⁴ ErtugrulGokcekuy, 'Does Someone Else's Industry Contribute to Democratization?', *Journal* 2, no. 1 (2022): 214–16.

⁴⁵ Velasco González et al., 'Prejudice towards Muslims in the Netherlands: Testing Integrated Threat Theory'.

CONCLUSION

The first section of this article has argued that there were socio-political inducements for public discontent from the onset of Turkish and Moroccan immigration within the Dutch society. However, these were mere discontentment and nowhere near as serious as extreme right pronouncements made by Dutch politicians as in the last two decades. One conclusion is that the Dutch political society has progressively become more prejudicial creating *political distrust* causing anti-democratic political climate. This article has looked into the relationship between negative verbal remarks made by Dutch politicians, Muslim individuals, Islam and violence. The central question was whether violence proneness of Muslim individuals (*hard approach 'physical if necessary'*) can be explained by Islam or by negative remarks of Dutch politicians. Political trust is a crucial factor for the good functioning and democratic sustainability. We do know that for democracy to function well, trust in politicians as well as political institutions is critical. Research shows that political trust is key for democratic societies to counter-balance populism, yet I have also pointed out that existing research is inadequate.

To summarize the findings, I was able to find a strong correlation between Muslim individuals' distrust in Dutch politicians and violence proneness. On the other side the analysis did not deliver any correlation between centrality of Islam and violence proneness. When looked at predicted probabilities, it could be observed that there was a 20% probability that a male respondent could be prone to violence when felt to be discriminated, and yet believed that Dutch politicians trust Muslims or Islam. The probability of being prone towards violence increased to 42% for a male respondent who felt being discriminated, and believed that Dutch politicians distrust Islam or Muslims. The constructed model has confirmed that there is a relationship between violence proneness of Muslim individuals and distrust of Dutch political figures in Islam or Muslims. This study points to the need that more research must be done to confirm the findings of this study and gain insight in the long-term effects of radical right and populist movements and associated behaviour.

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