

## ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION PREVENTION FORMS AND POLICIES IN GOODS AND SERVICES PROCUREMENT: E-PROCUREMENT AS A SOLUTION



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### Abstract

Procurement of Goods and Services (PBJ) is a crucial component of governance that supports transparency, sustainable development, and poverty alleviation. However, the procurement process is highly vulnerable to illegal practices such as bribery, bid manipulation, collusion, nepotism, cronyism, and abuse of power by public officials. This article aims to analyze the forms of corruption, their impact on PBJ, and the policies that can be implemented to address these issues. The research employed a literature review, analyzing 60 selected articles from SCOPUS and SINTA databases. The analysis results show that corruption in PBJ includes bribery, bid manipulation, cartels, collusion, political involvement, abuse of power, favoritism, nepotism, cronyism, bid-rigging, clientelism, price markup, and manipulation of PBJ quality. These irregularities have detrimental effects on the economic, social, and political aspects, as well as causing direct losses to the state and government institutions. The analysis suggests anti-corruption policies such as strict regulations, e-procurement technology, and strengthening oversight institutions to prevent these issues. E-procurement is an effective solution to enhance transparency and reduce interactions that are susceptible to bribery. In conclusion, collaborative efforts involving regulation, technology, and independent oversight are essential to achieving a transparent, competitive, and corruption-free procurement process. This research is expected to contribute to more effective PBJ policy reforms.

**Keywords:** Procurement of Goods and Services, Corruption, Procurement Policies

## INTRODUCTION

Public procurement is an essential and vital element in transparent governance, poverty alleviation, and sustainable development (World Bank, 2020). As one of the government's primary duties, procurement is a critical component of the institutional process that ensures the smooth administration of public services. Public procurement involves acquiring services, goods, and construction projects from third-party companies, comprising a significant portion of government expenditures (OECD, 2021, as cited in Lyra et al., 2022). Globally, governments allocate approximately US\$9.5 trillion annually for public contracts, with developing countries spending around 15–22 percent of their GDP on procurement (World Bank, 2020).

Governments must ensure transparency and competitiveness in procurement due to the large budget allocations. Governments worldwide have implemented various laws and guidelines to enforce the highest ethical standards in procurement procedures. If people violate these rules and ethical standards, they disrupt public service delivery and put good governance at risk (Dorasamy & Fagbadebo, 2021). The primary goal of public procurement is to guarantee competition driven by either price or quality (Wittberg & Fazekas, 2023). An effective procurement system focuses on two categories of objectives: procurement-related goals, such as ensuring quality, timeliness, and cost control, reducing business, financial, and technical risks, enhancing competition, and maintaining integrity; and non-procurement goals, which include supporting domestic companies for economic benefits, promoting environmental sustainability by using recycled materials, advancing social objectives by supporting minority- and women-owned businesses, and addressing international relations through global trade agreements (Thai, 2017).

However, public procurement is highly susceptible to illegal activities occurring at almost every stage (Rustiarini et al., 2019, as cited in Lyra et al., 2022), from planning to delivery. This vulnerability is due to the significant amounts of money at stake and the volume of contracts. Additionally, public officials may abuse their power by designing evaluation criteria to favor certain companies or manipulating procurement processes to award contracts to preferred firms (Soreide, 2002, as cited in UNODC, 2018), the numerous stakeholders involved in procurement often make it prone to irregularities and corrupt

practices. This allows the political elite to exploit state power for personal or group gain, disregarding established rules and harming the public.

While procurement aims to improve public services, corruption by political elites undermines government accountability and threatens good governance. Consequently, governance crises arise, leading to poor public services, stalled projects, and inadequate infrastructure (Dorasamy & Fagbadebo, 2021). Corruption in procurement seriously affects the entire public administration system (Graycar, 2019), leading to all the negative impacts typically associated with corruption (UNODC, 2018). Corruption in the public sector can have detrimental effects on the economy. Its spread has diminished the government's ability to deliver services efficiently, ultimately creating a governance crisis (Dorasamy & Fagbadebo, 2021). This situation undermines public trust in the government and weakens the public integrity essential for promoting common welfare (UNODC, 2018). The impact of corruption not only affects economic growth and societal well-being but also damages the democratic system and national goals. Warren (2004) explains corruption weakens government effectiveness by turning public institutions into tools for private gain. Put simply, corruption constrains the democratic arena by allowing individuals to exploit public institutions for their gain. This happens not only through budget waste but also when corrupt actors direct public efforts toward sectors that benefit them, often at the expense of more critical areas (Dorasamy & Fagbadebo, 2021).

Global procurement spending reportedly reaches US\$13 trillion annually (Open Contracting Partnership, 2020) while bribery and related costs drain an estimated US\$1.5 to US\$2 trillion annually (Williams-Elegbe & Tillipman, 2024). In Indonesia, public procurement accounts for 30 percent of the national budget. Indonesia loses approximately US\$15 billion annually due to procurement process weaknesses and deficient transparency levels (Transparency International, 2023). Data from the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) shows that, between 2004 and 2024, public procurement corruption made up 22.4% of the 1.512 cases they handled. Furthermore, bribery, which often occurs in procurement, was the highest case category, representing 65.4% of the 1.512 cases. This indicates that the procurement process in Indonesia is highly vulnerable to corruption, especially bribery, which significantly contributes to state losses (ICW, 2022). Weak

transparency and oversight make the process susceptible to manipulation by irresponsible actors, significantly impacting the efficient use of state funds. Data from KPK shows that procurement-related corruption is an administrative issue and one of the primary sources of financial misappropriation that has persisted over the past two decades. Considering the significant corruption in public procurement, in-depth research is necessary to identify the prevalent types of corruption in the procurement process and their effects and outline effective policies for preventing such practices. This research is anticipated to enhance the transparency and integrity of procurement systems and support more robust policy reforms.

## **RESEARCH METHOD**

This study aims to describe and analyze the forms of corruption in the public procurement process and identify appropriate policies to prevent such irregularities. The research uses a literature review approach, with data collected from reputable international and national journal articles in the SCOPUS and SINTA databases. The data collection involved two stages: first, searching for articles using the keyword “corruption in procurement” within the 2004 to 2023 timeframe, and second, mapping the topics to pinpoint relevant articles. Out of the 110 articles retrieved, researchers selected 60 for thematic analysis. This analysis focuses on three main research questions: 1) What are the forms of corruption in public procurement? 2) What are the impacts of this corruption? and 3) Which are the most effective policies for preventing corruption in public procurement?

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **Forms of Corruption on Public Procurement**

#### **Bribery**

Bribery is the most frequently discussed form of corruption in the literature on public procurement, appearing in 33 publications by A ta (2022), Brianzoni et al., (2015), Burguet (2017), Caillaud & Lambert-Mogiliansky (2021), Chandel & Sarkar (2023), Clark et al. (2018), Dastidar & Jain (2023), Dastidar & Mukherjee (2014), Fadhillah & Juwono (2020), Fazekas et al. (2022), Fazekas et al. (2022), Ferwerda et al. (2017), Gottschalk & Smith (2016), Graycar (2019), Hao et al. (2023), Hudon & Garzón (2016), Jiménez et al. (2022),

Jones (2021), Kang et al. (2023), Lyra et al. (2022), Matza et al. (2020), Mironov & Zhuravskaya (2016), Mubangizi & Sewpersadh (2017), Murillo et al. (2023), Mizoguchi & Van Quyen (2014), Nemeč et al. (2023), Neu et al. (2015), Onwujekwe et al. (2023), Sikka & Lehman (2015), Williams-Elegbe (2018), Wittberg & Fazekas (2023), Fan et al. (2021), and Xu & Li (2019), all of which highlight this issue. Bribery in public procurement is believed to increase the cost of goods, services, or projects by an estimated 8–25 percent (Bosio et al., 2020, as cited in Williams-Elegbe & Tillipman, 2024).

Bribery occurs when a person or entity rewards officials or responsible parties in exchange for benefits, such as contract awards or preferences in tenders. These rewards can be commissions, or project fees (Murillo et al., 2023), that ultimately affect procurement outcomes (Gottschalk & Smith, 2016; Xu & Li, 2019). In the public procurement sector, actors such as regional heads, procurement officials, or decision-makers typically receive bribes before approving contracts (Dorasamy & Fagbadebo, 2021). Political involvement often plays a crucial role in facilitating bribery. For example, in Indonesia in 2021, the director of PT SSN allegedly promised Rp 2.6 billion to the Regent of Musi Banyuasin to secure a tender for a Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR) project (ICW, 2022). This case illustrates how public officials misuse their positions to award projects to companies that pay bribes, undermining the integrity and transparency of the procurement process. Additionally, bribery can occur between companies, where one bidder pays another to withdraw from the tender, thus minimizing competition and maximizing the project's chance of winning (Wittberg & Fazekas, 2023). Bribery not only undermines fairness in the procurement process but also lowers the quality of goods or services, as contracts go to those who pay bribes rather than those who offer the best value or quality.

### **Bid Manipulation, Cartels, and Collusion**

Bid manipulation, cartels, and collusion are significant forms of corruption in public procurement. In the literature, these practices are identified in 26 publications by Adam & Fazekas (2021), Bernatt & Jones (2023), Caillaud & Lambert-Mogiliansky (2021), Clark et al. (2018), Fadhillah & Juwono (2020), Mihály Fazekas & Luciana Cingolani (2017), Fazekas & Kocsis (2020), Ferwerda et al. (2017), Gong & Zhou (2015), Gottschalk & Smith (2016), Hao et al. (2023), Hudon & Garzón (2016), Jones (2021), Langr, (2018), Lisciandra

et al. (2022), Lyra et al. (2022), Mackey & Cuomo (2020), Matza et al. (2020), Mironov & Zhuravskaya (2016), Mizoguchi & Van Quyen (2014), Onwujekwe et al. (2023), Owusu et al. (2020), Owusu et al. (2021), Weingärtner et al. (2021), Williams-Elegbe (2018), and Wittberg & Fazekas (2023). These forms of corruption involve agreements between suppliers or suppliers and procurement organizers to inflate prices or manipulate tender outcomes, limiting competition and negatively affecting public finances. Bid manipulation, cartels, and collusion often work together, forming a web of anti-competitive practices.

Bid manipulation happens when officials rig the tender process to ensure a specific party wins, either by altering the specifications or submitting intentionally weak bids. Similarly, cartels form when two or more companies collaborate to influence the tender's outcome. As described by Bernatt & Jones (2023), cartel members often collaborate by taking turns winning tenders, using fake bids to manipulate the process. On the other hand, collusion involves illegal cooperation between suppliers and tender organizers, or between suppliers, to manipulate procurement outcomes for mutual benefit. Collusion is often central to cartel operations, where bid manipulation gives the illusion of competition, even though the outcome is already predetermined. These three practices severely undermine the principles of fair competition. As a result, the government and society suffer from inflated prices, low-quality goods and services, and a loss of efficiency in managing public budgets.

### **Political Involvement and Abuse of Power**

Political involvement often drives corruption in public procurement. Twenty-one publications have highlighted the role of political involvement and power abuse in public procurement, including works by Ata (2022), Baldi et al. (2016), Bernatt & Jones (2023), Brianzoni et al. (2015), Charron et al. (2017), Dastidar & Mukherjee (2014), Decarolis & Giorgiantonio (2022), Mihály Fazekas & Luciana Cingolani (2017), Graycar (2019), Hessami (2014), Hudon & Garzón (2016), Jiménez et al. (2022), Jones (2021), Lyra et al. (2022), Miranzo Díaz et al. (2023), Mironov & Zhuravskaya (2016), Mizoguchi & Van Quyen (2014), Neu et al. (2015), Toeba (2018), Williams-Elegbe (2018), and Yelli Diani & Kurniawan (2023). Government officials engage in this form of corruption by exploiting their authority to benefit themselves or specific groups, which ultimately erodes public trust in the

government. Politicians often exploit their authority in procurement projects by structuring contracts to benefit specific parties.

This practice frequently coincides with other forms of corruption, such as bid manipulation, collusion, nepotism, cronyism, bid-rigging, and clientelism. Furthermore, contractors are often required to pay a "fee." This shows how individuals wield political power to unfairly control procurement for personal or group gain (Mihály Fazekas & Luciana Cingolani, 2017). This phenomenon usually begins with regional elections, where candidates receive financial support from campaign donors. Once elected, regional heads often feel compelled to repay their donors by awarding them procurement projects, with the donors offering a 'project fee' in return (Ata, 2022). Scholars have widely discussed this as a common form of power abuse (Jiménez et al., 2022); Lyra et al., 2022).

### **Favoritism, Nepotism, Cronyism, Bid-Rigging, and Clientelism**

A total of eighteen publications by Adam & Fazekas (2021), Ata (2022), Baldi et al. (2016), Caillaud & Lambert-Mogiliansky (2021), Charron et al. (2017), Dastidar & Jain (2023), Detkova et al. (2018), Fazekas & Kocsis (2020), Gong & Zhou (2015), Gottschalk & Smith (2016), Jones (2021), Lyra et al. (2022), Mironov & Zhuravskaya (2016), Miroslav et al. (2014), Mizoguchi & Van Quyen (2014), Nemeč et al. (2023), Soylyu et al. (2022), and Tkachenko et al. (2017) highlight corruption in public procurement related to favoritism, including nepotism, cronyism, bid-rigging, and clientelism. Nepotism involves granting benefits to family members or relatives, while cronyism favors friends or colleagues. Crony capitalism, a broader form of cronyism, happens when political actors deliberately manipulate public policy to benefit business groups with close connections to them (Dastidar & Jain, 2023). Clientelism is a form of political corruption that occurs through patron-client relationships, where political elites use public resources to mobilize political support in exchange for certain benefits. In public procurement, officials often award contracts based on personal or political relationships rather than quality or competence (KPK, 2023).

Bid-rigging happens when officials corrupt the bidding or tender process to favor the highest bribe-giver through predetermined outcomes. The tactics used include giving the bribe-giver early access to technical specifications or drafting bid requirements that benefit them. A lack of transparency, unclear specifications, and inadequate evaluations are also

often used to eliminate unwanted competitors, ensuring contracts are awarded to the desired party (Wrage & Birenbaum, as cited in Williams-Elegbe & Tillipman, 2024).

### **Markups**

Nine publications by Brianzoni et al. (2015), Fazekas et al. (2022), Fadhillah & Juwono (2020), Hudon & Garzón (2016), Lisciandra et al. (2022), Matza et al. (2020), Sikka & Lehman (2015), Xu & Li (2019), and Yelli Diani & Kurniawan (2023) highlight corruption through markups or price inflation. Markups involve inflating the price of goods or services well beyond their actual market value. This practice has a significant impact, wasting public funds and straining government budgets. Markups frequently occur during the procurement planning stage, where officials set prices based on arrangements that benefit certain parties instead of conducting valid market surveys (KPK, 2024b).

### **Manipulasi Kualitas PBJ**

Six publications by Brianzoni et al. (2015), Burguet (2017), Graycar (2019), Huang & Xia (2019), Mizoguchi & Van Quyen (2014), and Owusu et al. (2021), discuss the manipulation of quality in public procurement. In these cases, corrupt suppliers often lower the quality of goods or services to cut costs while still charging prices based on higher specifications. This quality manipulation usually occurs during the contract implementation and delivery stages, where the goods delivered do not meet the agreed-upon specifications or the work is incomplete, yet handover has already occurred. Additionally, during the monitoring stage, deviations often involve collusion between project implementers and supervisors, bribery of project supervisors, and oversight reports that do not reflect the actual condition of the completed work. These deviations harm project quality and reduce budget efficiency (KPK, 2024b), ultimately leading to poor infrastructure and public services that negatively impact society.

## **The Impact of Corruption on Public Procurement**

### **Economic Aspects**

Corruption in public procurement leads to inefficiency and waste of public funds. Nineteen publications, including Adam & Fazekas (2021), Baldi et al. (2016), Bernatt & Jones (2023), Charron et al. (2017), Clark et al. (2018), Dastidar & Jain (2023), Decarolis & Giorgiantonio (2022), Jiménez et al. (2022), Kohler & Dimancesco (2020), Langr (2018),

Lisciandra et al. (2022), Mackey & Cuomo (2020), Matza et al. (2020), Nesti (2014), Soylu et al. (2022), Williams-Elegbe (2018), Wittberg & Fazekas (2023), Xu & Li (2019) and Yelli Diani & Kurniawan (2023) highlight that corruption causes inefficiency and waste in public budgets. Corruption enables less efficient companies with political ties to bypass regulations and secure government procurement contracts, increasing inefficiency (Mironov & Zhuravskaya, 2016, as cited in Dorasamy & Fagbadebo (2021). This prevents the optimal use of public funds for society's benefit. Moreover, sixteen publications, including Ata (2022), Bernatt & Jones (2023), Brianzoni et al (2015), Dastidar & Jain (2023), Dastidar & Mukherjee (2014), Gong & Zhou (2015), Graycar (2019), Hao et al. (2023), Huang & Xia (2019), Jiménez et al. (2022), Jones (2021), Mizoguchi & Van Quyen (2014), Murillo et al. (2023), Nemeč et al. (2023), Owusu et al. (2021), and Yelli Diani & Kurniawan (2023), point out that corruption directly affects the standard of goods and services delivered in public projects. Bid manipulation and collusion cause service providers to deliver products or services far below standards. As a result, infrastructure and public services often fail to meet societal expectations, potentially endangering long-term viability, the natural environment, and human well-being (Kühn & Sherman, 2014, as cited in Williams-Elegbe & Tillipman, 2024).

Twelve publications, including Adam & Fazekas (2021), Graycar (2019), Hao et al. (2023), Hessami (2014), Jiménez et al. (2022), Jones (2021), Mackey & Cuomo (2020), Matza et al. (2020), Neupane et al. (2014), Toeba (2018), Weingärtner et al. (2021), and Yelli Diani & Kurniawan (2023) highlight the impact of corruption on economic development. Corruption results in significant misallocation of resources intended for social needs, taxes, labor, and time, making the economy increasingly inefficient (Klitgaard, 1988, as cited in Williams-Elegbe & Tillipman (2024). It also hinders investment, lowers competitiveness, and weakens business vitality, as both domestic and foreign investors are reluctant to invest in states plagued by widespread corruption due to legal uncertainty and the additional costs associated with bribery.

### **Social Aspects**

Seven publications by Caillaud & Lambert-Mogiliansky (2021), Charron et al. (2017), Matza et al. (2020), Mubangizi & Sewpersadh (2017), Owusu et al. (2021),

Weingärtner et al. (2021), serta Xu & Li (2019), highlight how corruption impedes social and environmental development. Projects aimed at improving social welfare often fail to meet their objectives because officials misuse allocated funds or do the work poorly. Corruption diverts funds from their intended purposes, causing crucial projects, such as social or environmental infrastructure, to fall short of expected standards.

### **Political Aspects**

Five publications, including Bernatt & Jones (2023), Hudon & Garzón (2016), Jones (2021), Mironov & Zhuravskaya (2016), and Mubangizi & Sewpersadh (2017), highlight that corruption erodes public trust in the government. Citizens become skeptical of government decisions in public procurement, as they perceive that many decisions are based on bribery or collusion rather than healthy competition. Additionally, corruption weakens the function of legal institutions. Three publications by Adam & Fazekas (2021), Bernatt & Jones (2023), and Jones (2021) emphasize that corruption undermines the independence of law enforcement agencies, making it difficult to enforce the law and perpetuating the cycle of corruption. The inability of legal institutions to act decisively against corrupt actors exacerbates the situation, undermining the rule of law and justice.

### **Direct Losses to the State and Government Institutions**

Twelve publications by Caillaud & Lambert-Mogiliansky (2021), Detkova et al. (2018), Huang & Xia (2019), Langr (2018), Lyra et al. (2022), Mironov & Zhuravskaya (2016), Mubangizi (2020), Nesti (2014), Sikka & Lehman (2015), Williams-Elegbe (2018), Fan et al. (2021), and Yelli Diani & Kurniawan (2023), emphasize how corruption in public procurement causes significant budgetary leaks. According to data from Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), state losses from corruption cases during 2013-2022 amounted to Rp238.14 trillion, based on court rulings from the first level to cassation (KPK, 2024b). Furthermore, corrupt officials choose projects that maximize personal gain rather than public welfare. This distorts resource allocation, preventing efficient management in a free market (Matza et al., 2020). Consequently, corruption harms the state budget and undermines the effectiveness of public service delivery and resource management.

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## **Anti-Corruption Policies in Public Procurement**

Governments have implemented various approaches to combat corruption in public procurement. Fifteen publications by Adam & Fazekas (2021), Aduwo et al. (2020), Arsyam et al. (2016), Ata (2022), Fadhillah & Juwono (2020), Gottschalk & Smith (2016), Jiménez et al. (2022), Jones (2021), Kang et al. (2023), Mackey & Cuomo (2020), Murillo et al. (2023), Neupane et al. (2014), Onwujekwe et al. (2023), Taufiq et al. (2023), serta Soylyu et al. (2022), demonstrate how technology like e-procurement and information systems enhances transparency and efficiency in public procurement. Comprehensive e-procurement systems can reduce human interaction, which is vulnerable to corruption, and facilitate monitoring and evaluation processes. This technology also enhances public involvement in oversight through open data. E-procurement plays a crucial role in reducing corrupt practices in construction project procurement. Its ability to accurately record inventories, ensure transparency in the bidding process, and minimize direct human interaction, which often provides opportunities for corruption, makes it an effective tool for strengthening oversight and accountability. With advanced automation features, e-procurement can also address issues such as document forgery, embezzlement, and cartel formation, which frequently occur in conventional procurement. In addition, e-procurement offers solutions to several weaknesses of paper-based procurement, such as geographic barriers and information asymmetry. By improving accessibility and fostering healthy competition among suppliers, e-procurement can limit nepotism and favoritism in the selection process. Therefore, implementing e-procurement creates a more transparent, efficient, and corruption-free procurement system (Aduwo et al., 2020). Digitalizing anti-corruption policies in procurement plays a crucial role in enhancing government transparency and accountability. Implementing technologies such as e-procurement, electronic declarations, and open data access can reduce opportunities for corruption while encouraging citizen participation in oversight. Digitalization enables global collaboration for knowledge-sharing and best practices, supporting more effective digital transformation. Nevertheless, addressing issues like data privacy risks, gaps in technology access, and cybersecurity is essential to ensure that the benefits of digitalization reach everyone. Inclusive and secure digital transformation

and increased digital literacy will be vital to combating corruption and building public trust (Kobets et al., 2024).

Additionally, technologies like blockchain provide secure and transparent financial transaction records, while blockchain-based intelligent contracts automatically execute, negotiate, and enforce agreements in procurement processes. Semantic technologies like RDF and SPARQL assist in analyzing contract documents and identifying suitable service providers, enabling better risk management in public procurement. Furthermore, four publications by Adam & Fazekas (2021), Caillaud & Lambert-Mogiliansky (2021), Decarolis & Giorgiantonio (2022), and Lyra et al. (2022) highlight the use of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and alert-based accountability to detect patterns of corruption. Machine learning algorithms can thoroughly examine data to detect anomalies indicating potential corruption, helping to detect practices that are difficult to uncover through conventional methods. According to Sanchez-Graells (2024), AI holds significant potential for anti-corruption procurement policies, but we should temper expectations for its application. AI can assist in acquiring information, analyzing data, detecting anomalies, and predicting corruption risks. However, challenges such as limited digital data, poor dataset quality due to the hidden nature of corruption, and legal restrictions on explainable AI solutions reduce its effectiveness. Although AI can complement corruption prevention efforts, traditional oversight and law enforcement infrastructures are still necessary. Therefore, improving data management and integration is an important step, but it is not sufficient to address more complex corruption. We should view AI as a supplement, not a replacement, for traditional efforts in fighting public procurement corruption. Furthermore, AI implementation introduces new governance risks, requiring additional layers of oversight and more significant investment in resources to support effective implementation.

This underscores that e-procurement remains highly relevant and essential for public procurement. Despite various challenges, such as data privacy and cybersecurity, e-procurement continues to be an effective solution for minimizing opportunities for corruption, improving transparency, and strengthening accountability. With features like open data and process automation, e-procurement reduces human interaction vulnerable to bribery and manipulation and enhances accessibility and healthy competition among

suppliers. Moreover, adding more advanced systems, such as AI, big data, and blockchain, can further strengthen the integrity of e-procurement. By adopting these advanced technologies, e-procurement enhances efficiency and transparency. It tightens oversight against potential irregularities, making it an increasingly important tool in creating a more transparent, accountable, and corruption-free procurement process.

Additionally, fourteen publications by Bernatt & Jones (2023), Brianzoni et al. (2015), Hudon & Garzón (2016), Jones (2021), Kohler & Dimancesco (2020), Mironov & Zhuravskaya (2016), Neu et al. (2015), Nesti (2014), Owusu et al. (2020), Sikka & Lehman (2015), Tkachenko et al. (2017), Toeba (2018), Williams-Elegbe (2018) and Xu & Li (2019), emphasize the importance of the rule of law and the independence of law enforcement institutions in preventing corruption in procurement. Strengthening oversight institutions and implementing strict law enforcement against corrupt actors is crucial to creating a corruption-free procurement environment. Additionally, three publications by Fazekas & Kocsis (2020), Fazekas et al. (2016), and Lisciandra et al. (2022) emphasize the importance of using the Corruption Risk Index (CRI) as a guide in anti-corruption policies. This indicator helps policymakers identify corruption risks at various stages of procurement, enabling them to design more effective and targeted prevention strategies.

Furthermore, six publications by Baldi et al. (2016), Hudon & Garzón (2016), Jiménez et al. (2022), Mihály Fazekas & Luciana Cingolani (2017), Mubangizi & Sewpersadh (2017), and Sargiacomo et al. (2015) highlight the implementation of public governance indices as tools to enhance the effectiveness of government institutions. These indices aim to reduce corruption opportunities and strengthen public officials' accountability. Eight other publications by Bernatt & Jones (2023), Caillaud & Lambert-Mogiliansky (2021), Charron et al. (2017), Fazekas & Kocsis (2020), Jones (2021), Miranzo Díaz et al. (2023), Mubangizi & Sewpersadh (2017), and Neu et al. (2015) discuss the importance of integrity pacts, codes of ethics, and public official training as steps to prevent corruption. Integrity is one of the seven core principles in the World Bank's Procurement Policy, essential to achieving the best value while promoting sustainable development (World Bank, 2016 as cited in Williams-Elegbe & Tillipman, 2024). Proper integrity management enhances

accountability and promotes a more transparent and honest work culture among public officials.

Seven publications by Bernatt & Jones (2023), Jones (2021), Kang et al. (2023), Mubangizi & Sewpersadh (2017), Nemec et al. (2023), Owusu et al. (2020), serta Owusu et al. (2021b), emphasize the importance of anti-corruption laws addressing bribery and competition as a strategy to prevent corruption in public procurement. Strict regulations can create a transparent and corruption-free procurement environment. Experts also recognize the human rights-based approach as an important strategy for enhancing transparency and accountability in procurement procedures. Additionally, twelve publications by Bernatt & Jones (2023), Burguet (2017), Kohler & Dimancesco (2020), Miroslav et al. (2014), Nemec et al. (2023), Neu et al. (2015), Tkachenko et al. (2017), Toeba (2018), Taufiq et al. (2023), Williams-Elegbe (2018), Wittberg & Fazekas (2023), and Xu & Li (2019) emphasize the importance of strict regulations to prevent corruption in public procurement. Laws such as the Anti-Corruption, Transparency, and Accountability (ACTA) initiative aim to establish a procurement system that is more transparent and accountable by harmonizing rules that promote fair competition and prevent bid manipulation. Anti-fraud policies also effectively reduce corruption in public procurement, though improvements in training, education, and internal oversight are necessary (Nurhajati et al., 2023). Open contracts and integrity pacts also help ensure fairness and prevent corruption in procurement processes. Finally, five publications by Other publications, as many as five publications from Decarolis & Giorgiantonio (2022), Ferwerda et al. (2017), Hao et al. (2023), Huang & Xia (2019) serta Owusu et al. (2020), discuss the importance of standardized tender policies. Implementing red flag systems can help identify potential corruption early on, thereby minimizing the risk of abuse. Fuzzy synthetic evaluation methods help assess bids objectively by integrating qualitative and quantitative factors, resulting in more transparent and accountable decisions.

## **CONCLUSION**

Corruption in public procurement appears in various notable forms, such as bribery and bid manipulation, cartels, collusion, political involvement, nepotism, cronyism, markups, and quality manipulation. Each of these forms of corruption directly undermines the integrity,

efficiency, and transparency of public procurement processes. These practices adversely affect the quality of goods and services delivered, cause a waste of public funds, and erode public trust in government. From an economic perspective, corruption leads to inefficiency, hinders investment, and weakens competitiveness. From a social perspective, corruption impedes social and environmental development, while from a political perspective, corruption erodes public trust and undermines the functioning of legal institutions. Furthermore, this study highlights the importance of implementing technologies such as e-procurement and anti-corruption policies through strict regulations, using corruption risk indicators, and strengthening the rule of law. A collaborative effort between regulations, technology, and increased accountability among public officials is an essential strategy for creating a more transparent, efficient, and corruption-free procurement system.

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