
**THE INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES OF THE
REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (KOMINDA) IN SUPPORTING
NATIONAL SECURITY STABILITY IN INDONESIA**



Franziska Zeligke¹
Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia
franziskazeligke@gmail.com

Stanislaus Riyanta²
Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia
stanislausriyanta@gmail.com

Abstract

This article analyzes the challenges in task execution faced by the Regional Intelligence Community (Kominda) institution in supporting national security stability in the regions, as well as the efforts that can be undertaken to address these challenges. This research is fundamentally based on Article 30 of Law No. 17 of 2011 concerning State Intelligence, which asserts the critical importance of inter-agency coordination to maintain the security and order of the nation, as well as the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 16 of 2011 concerning Kominda, which emphasizes Kominda's strategic role in the early detection of potential threats as an integral part of the national intelligence system. However, in practice, the implementation of Kominda's duties and functions continues to encounter a variety of challenges that have not been systematically mapped. This study aims to comprehend the factors inhibiting the effectiveness of Kominda's task execution in contributing to the strengthening of national resilience in a sustainable manner. The research employs the Institutional Capacity Theory approach, which emphasizes the importance of organizational structure, resources, and legitimacy in shaping the performance of public institutions. This research is expected to offer strategic recommendations for Kominda's institutional improvement, particularly regarding coordination mechanisms, human resource capacity, and budgetary support, thereby serving as a crucial policy reference for developing a professional, adaptive, and accountable intelligence apparatus.

Keywords: Intelligence, Institutional Capacity, National Resilience

INTRODUCTION

National security is the fundamental prerequisite for guaranteeing the continuity of the nation-state. Within the diverse socio-cultural landscape of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), the responsibility for maintaining security and stability extends beyond the central government and requires the active involvement of regional administrations. The Regional Intelligence Community (Kominda) was established as an integral component of the national intelligence system, with the mandate to conduct early detection of potential threats within its respective jurisdiction. This study, therefore, aims to describe the phenomena and empirical facts concerning the challenges confronting Kominda's mandate, concurrently examining the constraining factors from an institutional perspective. The Institutional Capacity Theory—developed by Hall and Taylor (1996)—is utilised as the analytical framework, given its emphasis on three institutional pillars: organizational structure, human and financial resources, and political and social legitimacy, all of which are pivotal in determining the effectiveness of intelligence duties at the sub-national level.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The Regional Intelligence Community (Kominda)

The Regional Intelligence Community (Kominda) functions as a coordination forum, comprising leading figures from state intelligence agencies at the sub-national level, established to support the execution of core intelligence functions—investigation, security, and mobilisation—across both provincial and regency/city tiers. Kominda's role is critically important, as stipulated in Articles 4 and 5 of Law No. 17 of 2011, which positions the intelligence apparatus as the frontline of the national security system. Furthermore, in line with Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 16 of 2011, Kominda is charged with the essential duties of planning, aggregating, coordinating, and communicating intelligence information or material from diverse sources related to potential issues, indicators, or events that could jeopardize regional national stability.

The membership of Kominda is officially determined by the regional head at the corresponding administrative level. At the provincial tier, the Governor presides as the chairperson, with the Head of the Regional Intelligence Agency (Kabinda) serving as the executive director (*pelaksana harian*), and the Head of the Regional National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol) as the secretary. The members are drawn from the intelligence elements of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), the National Police (Polri), the High Prosecutor's Office (Kejaksaan Tinggi), Immigration, Tax, Customs and Excise, banking institutions, and other relevant agencies. Subsequently, at the regency/city tier, the Regent/Mayor functions as the chairperson, with the local Polri intelligence element serving as the executive director, and the Regional Kesbangpol Head as the secretary, with membership drawn from similar component elements. This structure is deliberately formulated to facilitate a cross-sectoral coordinative approach necessary for the effective discharge of regional intelligence duties.

Kominda executes both vertical and horizontal coordination to ensure the effectiveness of its task execution. Vertical coordination is performed between the Kominda at the Regency/City level and the Kominda at the Provincial level, and also between the

Provincial Kominda and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Conversely, horizontal coordination is carried out among the intelligence elements within the region, encompassing all Kominda members and other relevant agencies. This coordinative mandate is explicitly contained within Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 67 of 2013, which underscores the critical importance of synergy, harmonisation, and integration of intelligence activities in maintaining national security. Consequently, the existence and continuous strengthening of Kominda's coordination mechanisms serve as a vital instrument in building an adaptive and responsive regional intelligence system that supports comprehensive national resilience.

Intelligence findings and the ceaseless flux of information dynamics necessitate coordination that is both consistent and sustainable. The evolution of critical issues must be scrupulously tracked and monitored to precisely determine the extent of a problem's development, thereby enabling policymakers to respond with appropriate and structured measures. Coordination is an absolute necessity in intelligence activities to ensure optimal investigative outcomes. The collaborative efforts undertaken across the functions of intelligence—whether it be investigation, security, or mobilisation—are executed specifically to determine the most effective tactics and techniques to be employed (Armawi, 2014).

According to Tripathi and Raddy (in Moekijat, 1994:39), there exist nine interconnected stages to achieve effective coordination. These stages encompass direct interaction, early involvement, continuity, flexibility, clarity of objectives, a streamlined organizational structure, clear delineation of authority and responsibility, efficient communication, and effective leadership and supervision. Within the organizational context of Kominda, these nine elements are applied as an integral part of the process to comprehensively unify intelligence goals and activities. Thus, the success of Kominda's coordination is highly contingent upon the integrated and simultaneous application of these nine stages across every intelligence activity undertaken.

Institutional Capacity Theory

The Institutional Capacity Theory offers a compelling and systematic perspective for assessing the degree to which an institution can execute its prescribed functions and roles effectively. In their seminal and classic work, *Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms* (Hall and Taylor, 1996), Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor assert that institutional capacity is fundamentally erected upon three main pillars: the institutional structure itself, the availability of resources, and legitimacy—both political and social. These three elements are not isolated; rather, they are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, collectively determining the extent to which a public institution can adequately respond to the demands of both its internal and external environments.

If we apply this framework to the context of regional intelligence institutions, particularly the Regional Intelligence Community (Kominda), the dimension of institutional structure must be assessed by the clarity with which Kominda's division of duties, functions, and operational mechanisms are articulated in the existing regulations—as well as the extent to which these rules are tangibly implemented in bureaucratic practice. This clarity is crucial, considering the coordinative nature of the intelligence role, which mandates the existence of efficient procedures and a well-defined structure.

Furthermore, the resources held by the institution become another determining factor. This encompasses not only the sheer number of personnel but, crucially, their quality and

competence in comprehending the dynamics of intelligence work. In addition, adequate budgetary support, alongside the availability of sufficient facilities and infrastructure, also constitutes a vital component of institutional capacity.

However, in the specific context of intelligence, legitimacy arguably emerges as the most crucial aspect. Institutions like Kominda operate within an exceedingly sensitive domain; thus, the success of their mandate is highly contingent upon the level of trust—both from the public and among inter-institutional actors. Without robust legitimacy, the process of information exchange and cross-institutional coordination becomes exceedingly difficult to achieve optimally.

Institutional Capacity Theory was selected for this study because it provides a broad yet applicable conceptual framework for examining the structural and operational issues confronting Kominda. Within this framework, an institution is not merely viewed as the product of legal statutes or regulations, but also as a social entity shaped by the interaction among actors, the dynamics of inter-institutional relationships, and the encompassing strategic conditions. Therefore, building institutional capacity is not just a matter of administrative overhaul, but also a concerted effort to understand and address the challenges arising from the complexity of the environment in which the institution operates.

The Existence of Kominda and its Nexus with National Resilience

Kominda serves as a crucial instrument within Indonesia's decentralized intelligence structure, established to support the execution of intelligence functions at the regional level. Based on Minister of Home Affairs Regulation (Permendagri) No. 16 of 2011, Kominda functions as a coordination forum for intelligence elements, tasked with aggregating, coordinating, and analysing information related to potential threats within its jurisdiction, subsequently submitting these findings to the regional head for policy consideration. By fulfilling this function, Kominda stands on the frontline in executing early detection, early warning, and early prevention against disturbances to regional security stability, which holds direct implications for national security.

Within the framework of the national defence and security system, the existence of Kominda is highly relevant to the concept of National Resilience (Ketahanan Nasional). According to the volume *Ketahanan Nasional: Konsepsi dan Strategi Nasional* by Suryosubroto (2002), National Resilience is defined as:

"The dynamic condition of a nation, embodying tenacity and fortitude in confronting and overcoming all forms of threats, disturbances, obstacles, and challenges, both internal and external, that endanger the survival of the nation and state."

This definition aligns with the stipulation in Article 1 of Law No. 17 of 2011 concerning State Intelligence, which mentions that national resilience is part of the national security system that prioritises the safety, integrity, and sustainability of the nation's development.

Theoretically, national resilience is inherently multidimensional, encompassing ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, defence, and security aspects (Azhari, 2018: *Jurnal Ketahanan Nasional*). In this context, Kominda constitutes a vital component of the security and order dimension, while also supporting the aspects of political and social stability. The presence of Kominda empowers regions to possess rapid, localised detection

capacity, based on coordinated intelligence information, enabling strategic decisions to be made more accurately and timely.

Consequently, Kominda's role is not confined merely to technical intelligence activities, but also serves as a primary supporting element in constructing regional resilience as an integral part of national resilience. Without an effective regional intelligence coordination system like Kominda, the state's response to non-conventional threats such as radicalism, separatism, transnational crime, and disinformation will be significantly hampered. Therefore, the institutional strengthening, cross-sectoral coordination, and enhancement of Kominda's human resource quality represent strategic steps to reinforce a robust, adaptive, and sustainable Indonesian national resilience system.

In the public governance literature, the concept of collaborative governance has been extensively studied as an approach that prioritises the involvement of multiple cross-sectoral actors in the process of public policy and service delivery (Voets, Brandsen, Koliba, & Verschuere, 2021). Collaborative governance is considered particularly relevant when public problems are complex ("wicked problems") and cannot be effectively addressed by a single institution alone. In the empirical analysis within the context of low-to-middle-income countries, the application of collaborative governance in the health sector demonstrates that challenges such as multidimensional leadership, inter-actor legitimacy, commitment sustainability, and institutional design must be addressed to prevent collaboration from becoming merely an administrative burden (Provan & Kenis, in the study on health governance).

In the domain of intelligence and security, specific literature regarding regional intelligence coordination remains limited. However, recent publicly accessible research attempts to address this gap. For instance, the study "Expanding the intelligence web model to address collaborative challenges in Indonesia" proposes a Collaborative Intelligence model that extends the "intelligence web" model by incorporating a collaboration space, the separation of internal and external control mechanisms, and the integration of trust and confidentiality within the Indonesian intelligence coordination structure. This model is theoretically and empirically relevant to the issues of coordination fragmentation, task redundancy, and the politicisation of information that frequently emerge in regional intelligence practices.

Furthermore, within the Indonesian context, there is research discussing the reconstruction of coordination regulations between intelligence agencies as an effort to strengthen the national intelligence system. The study "Reconstruction provisions on coordination between intelligence agencies to improve national security in Indonesia" found that duplication of authority between BIN and Baintelkam, alongside the absence of an integrated data exchange mechanism, constitutes a significant obstacle to responding to security threats (Sutanto & Haryanto, 2023). This finding indicates that regulatory and institutional integration challenges are real issues that must be addressed in developing intelligence institutional capacity at the regional level.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study employs a qualitative descriptive design with a policy analysis approach grounded in Institutional Capacity Theory (Hall & Taylor, 1996). The research aims to

examine comprehensively the institutional and operational challenges faced by the Regional Intelligence Community (Kominda) in supporting regional and national security stability. The qualitative approach was selected because it allows for an in-depth exploration of how institutional structures, human and financial resources, and legitimacy influence the effectiveness of Kominda's coordination and performance.

Data collection in this study relied primarily on documentary analysis, focusing on various legal, institutional, and academic sources. The primary materials include Law No. 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence, Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 16 of 2011 on Kominda, and Presidential Regulation No. 67 of 2013 on State Intelligence Coordination. These documents were complemented by scholarly articles, research reports, and policy studies related to intelligence governance, institutional coordination, and national security. Secondary data were obtained from academic databases such as Scopus, ResearchGate, and institutional repositories to provide theoretical support and comparative insights into the institutional performance of regional intelligence systems.

The analysis process adopted qualitative content analysis techniques. The collected data were categorized according to the three main pillars of Institutional Capacity Theory, namely organizational structure, resources, and legitimacy. The information was then organized into thematic discussions that connect institutional challenges with their operational implications. Interpretation was carried out by synthesizing the empirical findings with the theoretical framework of Institutional Capacity and the concept of Collaborative Governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Voets et al., 2021). This approach enabled the identification and systematic mapping of five major constraints—stigma, human resource limitations, budgetary constraints, fragmented coordination, and weak accountability systems—which collectively hinder Kominda's institutional effectiveness.

To maintain the validity and reliability of the analysis, triangulation of sources was applied through cross-referencing between legal documents, empirical findings, and relevant academic literature. Logical consistency was preserved by continuously comparing theoretical concepts with observed realities in the field. This process ensured that the conclusions drawn are theoretically grounded and empirically credible.

This study is normative-empirical in nature, focusing on institutional mechanisms rather than localized case studies. Accordingly, while the findings provide a general and comprehensive understanding of Kominda's institutional challenges, they may not fully capture the regional variations in implementation across provinces and districts. Overall, this research method integrates qualitative document analysis with Institutional Capacity Theory to explore how structural, resource-based, and legitimacy-related factors shape the operational performance of Kominda. The analytical framework emphasizes depth of understanding rather than quantitative generalization, providing a solid foundation for developing strategic policy recommendations to strengthen the regional intelligence coordination system in Indonesia.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The execution of Kominda's duties, as the primary gateway for the early detection system at the regional level, continues to confront various substantial challenges. Based on a review of normative documents, including Law No. 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence,

Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 16 of 2011 on Kominda, and Presidential Regulation No. 67 of 2013 on State Intelligence Coordination, alongside insights gathered from various academic journals, five primary categories of constraints were identified: negative perceptions toward intelligence, sub-optimal Human Resource (HR) quality, budgetary limitations, sub-optimal cross-institutional coordination, and the absence of clear transparency and accountability mechanisms.

A concise summary of the key obstacles to Kominda's task execution is presented in the table below:

Category of Constraint	Empirical Finding	Impact/Implication
Stigma of Intelligence as an Instrument of Power	Kominda is widely perceived as an extension of executive power, triggering resistance from other agencies and civil society.	Leads to a crisis of legitimacy (Hall & Taylor, 1996) and low inter-actor trust, severely impeding coordination.
Sub-optimal Human Resource Quality	Many members originate from non-intelligence work units, lacking adequate training in data analysis and intelligence interpretation.	Results in weak policy analysis and recommendations; Kominda tends to devolve into a purely bureaucratic forum.
Budgetary and Facility Limitations	Funding is reliant on the Regional Budget (APBD) and is often not prioritized. Support systems, such as conflict database systems, are minimal.	Routine activities, information gathering, and distribution are hampered; threat response is not real-time.
Fragmented Cross-Institutional Coordination	Coordination forums frequently function as mere formalities, with individual agencies (BIN, Polri, TNI, etc.) operating in silos.	Intelligence data becomes fragmented, and collaborative efforts are minimal.
Absence of Accountability and Transparency Systems	Performance evaluation and reporting mechanisms are often unclear; Kominda's recommendations frequently lack feedback from the regional head.	Hinders institutional learning; diminishes both legitimacy and overall effectiveness.

The Stigma of Intelligence as an Instrument of Power

One of the key findings in this research is the pervasive perception that intelligence, including Kominda's activities, functions as an extension of executive power. This perception originates from the long history of past intelligence practices, which were often alleged to be used for the interests of securing regime stability rather than state stability. This

situation triggers resistance from non-intelligence institutions and civil society, who harbour suspicion towards Kominda's activities.

Within Institutional Capacity Theory, this phenomenon reflects a crisis of legitimacy that results in the reduction of political and social support for the institution (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Legitimacy in the context of intelligence does not merely rely on regulations, but also on the perception of the public and bureaucratic actors regarding the functional benefit of the institution's presence. The perception of Kominda as a "tool of power" critically makes it difficult to build trust during coordination. As asserted by Sulistiyo & Listyani (2022), intelligence within a democratic system must effectively balance the need for operational confidentiality with public trust.

Sub-optimal Human Resource Quality

The composition of Kominda's personnel is not always ideal, despite its membership being inherently collective and cross-institutional. There is a considerable number of Kominda members who originate from work units that do not facilitate specific training or technical understanding of intelligence work. This lack of adequate training consequently leads to a low capability among members in conducting data analysis, intelligence interpretation, and formulating information-based policy recommendations.

Human capacity is a crucial aspect within an intelligence-based security system, as noted by Jumiati et al. (2021). This perspective is reinforced by the concept from Hall & Taylor (1996), which posits that one of the prerequisites for institutional capacity is the existence of competent Human Resources (HR) as the driving force behind institutional effectiveness. Without highly qualified HR, Kominda risks being reduced to a purely bureaucratic forum devoid of effective coordinative substance.

Budgetary and Supporting Facilities Limitations

Another finding, pervasive across nearly all regions studied, is the limitation of financial resources. In practice, Kominda's funding is charged to the Regional Budget (APBD), yet not all regional heads prioritize financing for the intelligence sector. This lack of financial commitment consequently impedes Kominda's activities, such as routine meetings, the collection and processing of information, and the distribution of intelligence reports.

Febriansyah (2022) notes that the neglect of the budgetary aspect often occurs because intelligence activities are non-public in nature and their results are not immediately visible. Within the context of Institutional Capacity, weak financial capacity directly restricts the institutional output. Furthermore, the absence of appropriate hardware and software, such as integrated intelligence information management systems or regional conflict databases, frequently results in Kominda being unable to respond to potential local threats in a real-time manner.

Fragmented Cross-Institutional Coordination

Ideally, Kominda should serve as the central node for coordination among regional intelligence elements, encompassing BIN (State Intelligence Agency), Polri (National Police), TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces), Immigration, the Prosecutor's Office, and Kesbangpol (National Unity and Politics Agency). However, in practice, this coordination is often merely an administrative formality, rather than being driven by operational necessity. There are numerous cases where individual institutions execute their intelligence activities

in isolation without sharing data or analytical findings, citing reasons of confidentiality or differences in command lines.

According to Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 67 of 2013, Kominda's coordination function is mandated to guarantee the harmonisation of data and a unified response to threats. However, coordination that is excessively hierarchical and sectoral renders the practice of collaborative governance sub-optimal.

As stipulated by Ansell & Gash (2007), the success of collaboration among public institutions necessitates trust among actors, a clear structure of leadership, and collective incentives. When coordination is not adequately facilitated by supporting communication systems, such as regular forums and standardised data exchange protocols, the effectiveness of coordination significantly diminishes.

The Absence of Accountability and Transparency Systems

Despite Kominda's highly strategic role, the mechanisms for performance evaluation and reporting remain unclear. Reports on intelligence activities are rarely disseminated publicly, and the regional head does not always provide feedback on the recommendations submitted by Kominda. This deficiency prevents the formation of an institutional learning cycle and systematic internal evaluation.

In a democratic security system, transparency and accountability are essential pillars. Sulistiyo & Listyani (2022) note that without a public evaluation system, regional intelligence agencies risk forfeiting their legitimacy and effectiveness. The lack of clear performance indicators and inadequate mechanisms for annual reporting cause Kominda to operate in an unmeasured grey area, both administratively and politically.

When the five findings detailed above are juxtaposed with the Institutional Capacity theoretical framework, it becomes evident that Kominda confronts serious challenges across all three main elements of the theory:

- a. Institutional Structure: While regulations are formally available (i.e., the de jure structure is sound), the implementation is not standardised across regions. Not all local Kominda bodies are active or operate in accordance with their mandate.
- b. Resources: Both the Human Resource (HR) aspect and the budgetary provisions are far from adequate.
- c. Legitimacy: The presence of negative stigma and the minimum level of transparency significantly diminish trust, both from coordinating partners and the public.

Meanwhile, from the perspective of Collaborative Governance, there is a notable absence of strong collaborative leadership, regular formal forums, and mechanisms for participatory decision-making. All these factors demonstrate that Kominda's effectiveness is more potential than actual. A synergistic effort from both the central and regional governments is urgently needed to transform Kominda into a strategic node that is not merely a formality, but one that operates with professional standards and is responsive to the dynamically evolving local security issues.

CONCLUSION

Based on the research findings and analysis of various legal documents, the Institutional Capacity Theory, and an extensive review of academic literature, it can be conclusively drawn that the execution of duties by the Regional Intelligence Community

(Kominda) continues to face serious challenges that directly impede the effectiveness of the regional early detection system.

These primary challenges span five fundamental aspects:

1. The persistent negative stigma that intelligence is merely an instrument of power.
2. The sub-optimal quality of Human Resources (HR) in comprehending and executing core intelligence functions.
3. Limitations in budgetary support and adequate infrastructure and facilities.
4. Cross-institutional coordination that has not yet run optimally.
5. The absence of measurable accountability and transparency systems.

From the perspective of Institutional Capacity Theory, this condition reflects a weakness in the organisational structure, which lacks uniformity, low resource support, and social-political legitimacy that remains fragile. Meanwhile, from the viewpoint of Collaborative Governance, Kominda has not yet managed to realise strong collaborative leadership, regular dialogue forums, or open communication and information exchange systems among regional intelligence agencies. This situation renders Kominda's existence more administratively formal than operationally functional, thereby preventing it from fully supporting national resilience in terms of early detection and threat response at the local level.

To strengthen Kominda's role and effectiveness in supporting national stability, the following strategic recommendations are proposed:

1. Reformulating the Institutional Structure

The central government must conduct a comprehensive evaluation of Kominda's structure and operational mechanisms across all regions. It is crucial to formulate more detailed, operational, and uniform implementation guidelines across regions, including measurable performance indicators and reporting mechanisms.

2. Enhancing Human Resource Competence

Prioritising training and certification programs in the intelligence field for all Kominda members must be a central agenda. This training should encompass not only technical aspects of intelligence but also collaborative approaches, intelligence ethics, and strategic analytical capabilities.

3. Strengthening Budgetary and Operational Facilities

The Ministry of Home Affairs and Regional Governments need to guarantee adequate budget allocation for Kominda's operations. This includes procuring a Regional Intelligence Information System (RIID), cybersecurity devices, and secure, confidential communication facilities for inter-agency use.

4. Revitalising Coordination Forums

There is a need for fixed coordination forums facilitated by Kesbangpol, where all regional intelligence elements can meet routinely to exchange information and jointly formulate strategies. In this context, the principle of limited transparency must be balanced with horizontal accountability among institutional actors.

5. Socialisation Campaign for Democratic Intelligence Functions

To erode the negative stigma, a comprehensive socialisation effort must be conducted to clarify the intelligence function as a protector of the state rather than as a repressive instrument of power. This is vital for building social legitimacy and securing support from non-intelligence institutions and civil society.

6. Implementing a National Kominda Performance Evaluation System

The central government can establish a periodic evaluation unit for Kominda's performance, involving elements from the Ministry of Home Affairs, BIN, and independent agencies, to maintain the quality of intelligence governance at the regional level.

By implementing the strategies outlined above, Kominda is expected to execute its role more optimally as an adaptive, professional local intelligence node capable of sustainably supporting national security stability in the current era of multidimensional threats.

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